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TOWNS OF 
THE WESTERN RAILROADS 
JOHN C. HUDSON 
From Chicago it is more than twenty-two 
hundred miles overland to any of the great 
cities of the Pacific Coast. For almost a century 
those who made this crossing traveled by train. 
If they chose to watch, and most did, they saw 
a three-day pageant of plain, mountain, and 
desert as it unfolded, hour after hour, across 
their view from the train window. The high 
point of the drama might have been an early 
evening view of Glacier Park, a crossing of the 
Great salt Lake at dawn, or a midday climb 
over Glorieta, but the thousands who saw the 
West this way brought home other memories, 
too. 
With a regularity that even the most disin-
terested traveler must have come to expect by 
journey's end, the pageant was diverted every 
few minutes by the fast approach through 
swirling dust and raining cinders of a neat row 
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of frame houses, followed always by store 
buildings, churches, elevators, a crossing where 
somebody stood waiting, then a depot, fol-
lowed by more houses, and fmally back to open 
fields again, all encountered in a flash, quickly 
blurred in the memory by so many others like 
it already passed. 
Day and night, these towns along the west-
ern railroads kept a rhythm that was inter-
rupted only when one of them was important 
enough to command the train to stop: La 
Junta, Glendive, or McCook might be observed 
more carefully, but hundreds of others were 
only glimpses, unremembered and unremark-
able, except in their predictable appearance 
and disappearance, mile after mile. They made 
an impression collectively, not as individual 
places. Their similarities were noted far more 
than their differences, not only by those who 
passed through them quickly and in succession, 
but also by those who knew them individually 
and up close. Railroad towns were far more 
numerous than most people realized, and the 
story of how they became such a fIXture of 
the landscape requires more than the simple, 
functional explanation that they were neces-
sary. 
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BACKGROUND 
As the transcontinental railways stretched 
west in the 1860s and '70s, "every temporary 
terminus of track laying became a city, wicked, 
wonderful, and short-lived." A former railroad 
agent wrote in Harper's Magazine of one such 
place at the end of track in western Kansas. 
The town of Coyote consisted of "canvas 
saloons, sheet-iron hotels, and sod dwellings, 
surrounded by tin cans and scattered playing 
cards" j its principal street, known as "Rat 
Row," was temporary home for a gang of Irish 
track laborers whose behavior was set forth in 
shocking detail. The writer held that "the 
Pacific railways have been responsible for more 
and worse towns than any other single cause.',1 
From the start, the railroad towns were 
condemned for their unimaginative design. 
"Dropped at random upon the flat and feature-
less prairies along our western railroads," the 
new towns were predicted to be failures. "In 
the ordinary course of civilization, such char-
acterless sites are not the ones to which popu-
lations cleave," wrote a typically harsh critic 
in the American Architect and Building News. 2 
To make matters worse, these blots on the 
record of city planning, these squalid shanty-
towns inhabited by ruffians, were the personal 
creations of railroad builders and their cronies, 
everyone's favorite symbols of greed and cor-
ruption in that Gilded Age.3 
The towns themselves were symbols of a 
necessary step in the westward march of 
civilization. Along with some of the other less 
prosaic aspects of pioneering, they shocked the 
educated and the refined, but they were abso-
lutely irresistable to others, and it was no time 
before a steady stream of young men and 
women began appearing on the muddy town-
sites to dicker for choice building lots in the 
grid of wooden stakes that poked up through 
the trampled prairie grass. The scene was re-
enacted thousands of times, in thousands of 
places. 
Some of the towns grew to become im-
portant cities. Tacoma, Reno, Fresno, Chey-
enne, Billings, and Albuquerque are successful 
examples, but even a list of half a dozen re-
quires some qualification because there is no 
suitably restrictive defmition of a "railroad 
town" that would allow counting their num-
bers.4 Every sizable town, east or west, was 
served by a railroad before the end of the nine-
teenth century. On the other hand, very few 
settlements actually were owned by railroads 
after the fashion of company towns of that 
period. 
What distinguishes a railroad town is that it 
was part of a railroad's strategy to populate and 
control the territory along its line. Successful 
or not, a railroad town was a component of 
corporate ambitions to manipulate people and 
resources, to command space and consolidate 
position, in order to maximize profits for the 
company. Hundreds of independent towns 
sprang up along the tracks, but they were not 
instruments of corporate strategy. Countless 
other towns were in place before railroads 
arrived, and sometimes they were successful 
in bringing the rails their way, but in neither 
of these cases could the railroad develop 
the full potential of a townsite for its own 
advantage. 
The first railroad towns appeared east of the 
Mississippi River before 1860. The spread of 
new railroads was curtailed sharply by the Civil 
War, but construction resumed shortly there-
after. The nation's first transcontinental line 
(Union Pacific-Central Pacific) was completed 
during a building cycle that peaked in 1871. 
Western railroad construction was at a stand-
still from 1873 to 1878, but this was followed 
by two periods of rapid growth between 1879 
and 1890, when most of the rest of the trans-
continental network was begun. A fmal spurt 
of construction in the first decade of the 
twentieth century completed the pattern.S 
Railroad towns were founded according to this 
same tempo of boom-bust cycles, and not as a 
steady, westward spread so often portrayed as 
typical of the advancing population frontier. 
From 1850 to 1910, these new towns were 
staked out across the nation. In the West, where 
few cities had existed before, they became the 
fabric of the settlement system. 
TOWN DEVELOPMENT 
The railroads' clear purpose in developing 
townsites was to promote and control business 
along the line. Every railroad that promoted 
agricultural settlement also tried to lure pro-
spective business people to their new towns. 
There was little disagreement over how the 
system should perform: farmers expected that 
trade-center towns would be created, merchants 
expected that there would be a surrounding 
population to support the trade, and railroads 
did their part by replicating in the West that 
system of town-country settlement familiar 
to Americans. Some railroad towns were 
created in nonagricultural areas, but the major-
ity of places were designed to be nothing more 
()l' less than trade centers. While anyone might 
promote business growth in towns along the 
line, the railroads had an interest in controlling 
it by limiting the number of stations. A regular 
spacing, at seven- to ten-mile intervals, dis-
couraged subsequent entries by independent 
promoters. 
Many railroads entered into agreements with 
private parties who platted and sold the town-
sites. Railroad survey engineers determined 
town locations and then turned over their data 
to townsite agents, who hired surveyors (some-
times from the railroad) to stake out the plat. 
There was no shortage of men who wanted to 
get into the business, especially during the 
boom periods of westward migration, but there 
was little chance for most of them. Railroads 
generally placed responsibility for all the town-
sites on a line in the hands of one man, or a 
small group, and those chosen were already 
connected financially with the road. James J. 
Hill of the Great Northern Railway insisted 
that his company did not engage in this busi-
ness, but Hill nonetheless had a substantial 
investment of his own money in several town-
site companies that appeared to be independent 
of his railroad. Such an arrangement was 
common. 
The greatest of all the western townsite 
creators was General Grenville M. Dodge, who 
had charge of the Union Pacific's towns in the 
TOWNS OF THE WESTERN RAILROADS 43 
late 1860s and later, with his son-in-law, R. E. 
Montgomery, directed townsites for the Texas 
& Pacific and the Fort Worth & Denver City. 
Dodge was in charge, although there is little 
evidence that he ever became well acquainted 
with his creations. 
It was General Dodge who claimed credit 
for influencing President Abraham Lincoln to 
choose the Union Pacific route west from 
Council Bluffs for the nation's first transcon-
tinental line. When Dodge left the army in 
1866, he immediately became chief engineer 
for the Union Pacific. That same year he was 
elected to Congress from the western district 
of Iowa, and in May, 1867, he was appointed 
agent in charge of Union Pacific townsites.6 
Dodge directed railroad operations from 
Washington, where his presence and his reputa-
tion clearly benefited the Union Pacific. He 
repeatedly requested, and was granted, the 
presence of cavalry units to protect construc-
tion gangs in Nebraska and Wyoming. He pre-
vailed upon Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton 
to urge a prohibition of the sale of whiskey in 
the vicinity of Union Pacific construction. 
Dodge knowingly had the city of Laramie, 
Wyoming, platted on the grounds of a United 
States military reservation (Fort Sanders) "for 
the protection of our property and the people 
connected with our enterprise," and then 
persuaded General William Tecumseh Sherman 
to approve it. 7 
In 1884, when he and Montgomery were 
involved in Texas townsites, Dodge sold the 
government land for military posts along the 
route of construction, and then used his influ-
ence to rearrange military operations so as to 
protect his investment. As a recent biographer 
noted, "Dodge's favorite occupation was any-
thing that made money, irrespective of whether 
it were ethical or permanent.,,8 No other man 
simultaneously commanded the attention of 
eastern railroad investors, the United States 
government, and local officials as Dodge could. 
He was atypical of townsite agents also in his 
ability to direct opertions he rarely, if ever, 
saw. Cheyenne, Laramie, Midland, and Odessa 
were some of his creations, but most of his 
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towns, like those platted by others, never 
achieved more than a modest success. 
Possession of a land grant was more than 
enough to entice a railroad to promote town-
sites. The Illinois Central Railroad, for example, 
the first to receive such a grant, was forbidden 
by its charter from engaging in the town 
business. The Illinois Central may have set the 
pattern for later years, however, by creating 
the Associates Land Company, an organiza-
tion led by some of the directors of the rail-
road, which platted and sold town lots around 
the railroad's stations in Illinois.9 
There is evidence of direct borrowing on 
the experience of earlier lines, and this may 
account for some of the uniformity in town-
site practices among railroads. In 1868 General 
Dodge sent a Union Pacific official, O. F. Davis, 
to visit the land departments of the Illinois 
Central and the Cedar Rapids & Missouri River. 
Davis examined both operations closely and 
made recommendations to Dodge on the strong 
points of each, an indication that the Union 
Pacific had not then decided how to market 
its land and town lots. 10 In addition, men with 
townsite experience on one road often hired 
out to companies just entering the business, 
and this succession moved the townsite strate-
gies from company to company as lines were 
built west. 
Outside parties were prohibited by law from 
creating townsites within the limits of the 
Union Pacific's land grant before it was sur-
veyed, but not after. In order to be sure of get-
ting desirable locations, the railroad had to 
select townsites ahead of the land survey, but 
in so doing they had no way of knowing if the 
tracts so selected were on their (odd-numbered) 
sections or not. Dodge called it "a singular 
streak of fortune" that "with one or two ex-
ceptions the towns are now on odd sections." 
Until the land grant was considered earned, 
however, the company could not give more 
than quit-claim deeds to town lots on its own 
sections. Grand Island, Nebraska, was platted 
partly on UP land and partly on a school sec-
tion purchased by the railroad. The company 
was able to issue general warranty deeds on 
the school section but not on the odd sec-
tion, a condition that skewed Grand Island's 
early development away from the railroad 
grant. 11 
While land grants encouraged townsite 
development, lines built without such aid prob-
ably generated just as many new towns. The 
promoter needed to sell only a few choice 
corner lots in order to recover his investment. 
The principal risk was the inevitable slump in 
lot sales that took place after the buyers' 
attention had shifted to the next new town 
down the tracks. If the town plat was too large 
in relation to demand, unsold lots became a 
burden in later years because of the annual 
property taxes that had to be paid on each lot. 
More than one railroad official tried to devise 
a means for vacating portions of a plat in order 
to avoid taxes. Most companies cut short their 
losses by selling all the remaining lots to a single 
buyer, or else they vacated those blocks in 
which no sales had been made.12 
A shift of emphasis in the townsite business 
occurred after the transcontinentals had been 
built across country; any new construction 
after that consisted of shorter branches or 
secondary lines designed to serve territory, 
rather than bridge it. As the network of rail-
road lines grew more weblike, companies 
began to vie with one another for the inter-
stitial trade, and in some cases the competition 
was intense.13 When the railroad builder 
had his eye on the horizon, he was less inter-
ested in adding more trade-center towns along 
his line, but when he was in the business of 
capturing trade, he packed in as many towns 
as he could in order to soak up as much pro-
duce of the rural hinterlands as possible. As a 
result, the number of new railroad towns 
increased, rather than decreased, after the 
transcontinental lines had been completed. 
The timing was as bad as it could have been. 
This strategy placed on the market hundreds 
of new trade-center towns with diminished 
prospects for rural business just when forces 
outside the system were dictating hard times 
for towns that did not already have an estab-
lished clientele. 
IDEOLOGY 
The railroad town was a Yankee invention. 
Some of its formative influences stemmed 
directly from the sources of railroad invest-
ment. New York and especially Boston sank 
far more of their investment capital in the 
western railroads than did Philadelphia, Balti-
more, or any other major city .14 The idea of 
building railroads west of the Berkshires, west 
of the Alleghenies, west of the Great Lakes, 
and fmally west of the Mississippi held a strong 
appeal for the young men of New England and 
upstate New York, and they came west to take 
part in one venture after another. These early 
western railroad builders were educated in 
engineering or in business, steeped in Yankee 
traditions of commerce, and eager to establish 
themselves financially in the new emporia of 
the West.1S 
Philadelphia is acknowledged to be the birth-
place of urban land speculation on this conti-
nent, and railroad towns saw plenty of it, but 
it was not Philadelphia's influence, its money, 
or its citizens that shaped western railroad 
towns. It was in New England and New York 
that the custom of formally platting a settle-
ment, no matter what the size or purpose, had 
become accepted by 1820, and it was into this 
milieu that the western railroad builders were 
born. A grid of streets-though it might have 
been an irregular one-with building lots of 
various sizes and extra-wide avenues for impor-
tant thoroughfares, all done up in a neat, com-
pact layout, was as Northern as an informal 
arrangement of stores and houses at a cross-
roads was typically Southern. New England's 
town settlements had not begun this way, and 
the southern colonies had some elegant urban 
designs, but these early traditions did not 
prevail past colonial times. 
The first decades of the nineteenth century 
witnessed what has been described as "an or~ 
of town platting" in western New York. 6 
Later, a similar orgy took place in Ohio, where 
a prescient territorial legislature had passed 
a law in 1800 requiring that town plats be 
filed with county recorder's offices. By 1878, 
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fifteen other states and territories had passed 
such a law; only two of them were south of the 
Ohio River.17 The idea that towns had to be 
platted to be real was fumly entrenched in the 
Northern mind, and along with that went the 
idea of selling lots on a checkerboard to ener-
getic businesspeople who would make an effort 
to boost the town. 
The Civil War injected another heavy dose 
of Northern influence into railroad building 
throughout the West. In his memoirs, General 
Dodge frankly acknowledged that "the con-
struction of the Union Pacific was upon a mili-
tary basis." The heads of the engineering parties 
and all the construction chiefs had been officers 
in the war.1S More than that, the Civil War, 
with its difficult logistical problems, had been 
a training ground for young men who found 
themselves thereby possessed of engineering 
skills that were in great demand by the new 
railroads in the West. Northern money and 
Northern men thus came to dominate the rail-
roads and their towns from Canada to the 
Gulf. Western railroad towns reflected this 
influence. 
The creation of a townsite was only the 
fust phase in a company's economic strategy. 
Railroad towns also had to be sold, which 
meant that prospective buyers had to be found, 
sent to the right places, and urged to bid on 
property. Townsite agents thus became infor-
mation brokers as well, responding to inquiries 
from merchants, lawyers, doctors, newspaper-
men, and a host of others who were seeking 
profitable business locations. Knowledgeable 
agents could suggest whether a given town 
might support several general stores, one or 
two hardware stores, one newspaper, and two 
livery stables; or whether another might sup-
port twice that many, in the same ratio. The 
formulas used to make such calculations were, 
in effect, folk location theories-preconceptions 
that anyone familiar with trade-center towns of 
the Middle West or the Northeast might have 
carried in his head. 
Townsite agents broke with tradition in one 
important respect. Since each business needed 
a building lot, the way to produce more lot 
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sales was to encourage more businesses, limited 
in size, each specializing in fewer lines of trade 
than had been the custom up to that time. 
General stores were welcome, but shoe stores, 
harness shops, confectioneries, oyster houses, 
and dry goods merchants were even better. The 
result was an expanded business population not 
warranted by the trade to be had. 
When railroad officials referred to "coloni-
zation," they were almost always speaking of 
their efforts to recruit farm settlers. Townsite 
promotions also involved recruiting people, 
but these operations generally were handled by 
a separate department of the railroad or by 
afHliates who did not draw a salary from the 
company at all. This division in railroad promo-
tion efforts reflected a strong ethnic and class 
bias held by railroad management, and it was a 
division to be replicated in the settlements 
themselves. 
Carl B. Schmidt, who was once commission-
er of, foreign immigration in the land depart-
ment of the Santa Fe Railroad, reminisced in 
his later years about how he had brought the 
wheat-raising Mennonites to Kansas. Then a 
successful businessman in Pueblo, Colorado, 
Schmidt was worried about the future supply 
of foreign -labor: "The fruit growers in the 
Pacific Coast states already complain that their 
Chinamen are ... getting too old to work; with 
no new Chinamen coming in, who is to take 
their place to prevent the orchards from be-
coming unprofitable and ruined?" In the Pueblo 
smelters, he said, "the men who do the rough, 
hard work are the Slavs and the Italians, while 
native Americans hold the positions of fore-
men, engineers, and other high places, in which 
the brain and the tongue are more essential 
than muscle.,,19 Schmidt, an immigrant him-
self, was not alone in his view that certain races 
and nationalities were especially suited to back-
breaking toil on farms and in factories. The 
land departments of nearly all western roads 
sought immigrants, especially from the non-
English-speaking countries of northern Europe, 
in the belief that they would work harder, com-
plain less, and produce more than anyone else. 
The approach was altogether different when 
it came to recruiting merchants. The immigra-
tion agents from competing railroads who 
fought each other over the Russian-German 
Mennonite wheat farmers would not have 
thought of enticing such people, or any others 
they perceived as peasants, to open up a store 
on a railroad townsite. Towns were for the 
native-born and educated; railroad officials 
perceived merchants to be such a class of 
people, who would somehow, immediately, 
through their brains and thrift, produce a 
prosperous town, just as the hard-working 
farmers beyond the city limits would begin 
producing bumper crops of grain. The picture 
was static, with no room for change, except 
for the type of growth that maintained the 
same pattern. 
TOWN PLANNING 
platting towns as a grid of streets demar-
cating blocks to be divided into building lots 
was an idea firmly established long before rail-
road companies took up real estate as a side-
line. The subject often is discussed in terms of 
land speculation and paper towns. That is a 
useful perspective on the motivations of many 
who boomed western townsites, but the empha-
sis is slightly misplaced in the case of railroad 
men. They entered this business as much to 
control town development as to profit from it. 
Their strategy was to eliminate, in effect, all 
but a few acres out of each hundred square 
miles as possible locations to do business. The 
railroad's instrument of control was the town-
site plat. 
plats brought back from the field by survey 
engineers and recorded in the county court-
houses were not undifferentiated, checkerboard 
designs. Each plat contained many visual cues 
as to how the town should develop. Residential 
lots, six to the blockface, were 50 feet wide. 
Anyone who looked at the official plat knew 
that the 25-foot lots were for businesses and 
that streets lined with these narrow lots would 
be in the business district. The most important 
streets were 80 or 100 feet wide, and buyers 
knew that the principal intersection would be 
where two streets of this width crossed. Resi-
dential streets were 60 feet wide, and alleys 
(generally thought desirable at that time) were 
20 feet. 20 The streets were named on the plat, 
but the names were less important than the 
visual cues. The corner of Main Street and First 
Avenue might or might not have been the best 
location in town; it depended on the width of 
the streets and the arrangement and sizes of 
lots. 
In the early years all lots were sold over the 
counter at fIxed, predetermined prices by resi-
dent agents of the railroad. It was soon learned, 
however, that an opening-day auction sale drew 
more attention because bidders knew they had 
to be there early and go high for those four 
choice corner lots, and that is where the auc-
tioneer generally began his sale. 
There was considerable variety in railroad 
town plats even within the rigid grid pattern 
they all followed. The earliest idea, and one 
popularized by the Illinois Central Associates, 
was a parallel arrangement with the railroad 
track as the axis of symmetry (Fig. 1).21 The 
prototype is hard to discern, but it was com-
monplace for businesses to face the artery of 
commerce, whether that was a road, a canal, 
or a waterfront; perhaps the railroads were imi-
tating that layout. The arrangement created 
two business streets, with buildings facing 
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each other across 300 feet of railroad right-
of-way. The wide strip was designed for ele-
vators, coal yards, and other businesses that 
needed direct access to the railroad. This land 
was underused, and some towns eventually 
acquired a portion of it for parks. It was rare 
to see both railroad-facing business streets 
developed equally; if First Avenue North was 
the major concentration, then First Avenue 
South became the "other side of the tracks" 
with a row of saloons and cheap hotels. It 
proved unreasonable to assume that the busi-
ness district would develop as a single unit 
where there was a strip of land the length of a 
football fIeld separating its two halves (Fig. 2). 
Placing businesses on both sides of the same 
street made better sense, and this arrangement 
soon gained favor. The most common solution 
was to have the business street cross the rail-
road tracks at an angle, so that only one cross-
ing was required between the two parts of the 
commercial district (Fig. 1).22 The railroad, 
with its strip of elevators alongside, bisected 
Main Street; the form was orthogonal. The 
depot generally was placed near this crossing, 
in the middle of the plat. Nevertheless, towns 
continued to develop more on one side of the 
tracks than on the other, and the orthogonal 
plan soon evolved to its fInal phase, the T-town 
(Fig. 1). 
T-TOWN 
FIG. 1. The changing form of the railroad town. Symmetric plats were the earliest, and they 
were succeeded by the orthogonal form, which in turn was replaced by the T-town variety. 
The types exhibit no clear geographical variation, however. See footnotes 21, 22, and 23 
for examples. 
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FlG. 2. Land along the tracks in a symmetric 
town was intended for businesses that needed 
access to the railroad (top: Farina, Illinois). 
In some cases the business district faced the 
tracks across a narrow park (bottom: Rock 
Springs, Wyoming). 
The T-town was a stable solution, more 
acceptable to the railroad and to townspeople 
(Fig. 3). It came into vogue in the final phases 
of railroad building, in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, when railroad towns 
were built mainly along branch and feeder 
lines in the United States, but it was dominant 
in the Canadian West, where the railroad build-
ing phases came into sequence about two de-
cades later. 23 
These progressive stages in the refinement of 
townsite design gradually removed the railroad 
from its position as a town's centerpiece. In 
the first shift, parallelism was replaced by 
orthogonality; in the second, symmetry was 
replaced by asymmetry. The trends in town 
platting were a response to practice, not plan-
ning; they reflected the gradual process of read-
justment and realignment made by the residents 
themselves. The T-town was a railroad innova-
tion that simply confirmed what had been 
happening anyway. 
TOWN BUILDING 
Just as the two-dimensional railroad town 
developed according to a few commonly shared 
_ ideas, the same was true of the third dimension 
as buildings and other material improvements 
started to appear. Some places took on a ragged 
lool:c from the start because of the railroad's 
clumsy attempts at land speculation. The Union 
Pacific followed the idea of selling every other 
24-foot business lot at a bargain price and with-
holding the rest from sale until lot prices had 
been bid up. Their man in Laramie suggested, 
quite reasonably, that some prospective buyers 
might want two adjacent lots in order to con-
struct wider buildings, but the company did not 
allow such sales. 24 The 24-foot restriction guar-
anteed that buildings would be small and that 
the businesses occupying them also would be 
small and specialized. Some of the Northern 
Pacific's towns were developed jointly with 
syndicates that owned every other lot (none 
adjacent) on the townsite. The syndicate men 
naturally pushed their own lots, while the rail-
road did little to sell theirs. 25 The result, again, 
was to spread the business district over a much 
larger area than was necessary and to create a 
townsite dotted with small buildings. 
One effect of these restrictions was that 
most business buildings were similar in size and 
shape. This meant that when one business went 
under and the proprietor wanted to sell out, he 
had little difficulty in fmding a buyer, no 
matter what use the new owner had in mind. 
Small buildings were moved easily, and it was 
common for a single structure to occupy more 
than one location and serve more than one 
function in its lifetime.26 This pattern persisted 
in towns that saw little new investment after 
the early boom years. A trickle of new busi-
nesses slowly filled in most of the gaps, creating 
FIG. 3. Main Street in the T-town begins at the railroad tracks, generally at a row of ele-
vators (top: High Prairie, Alberta) or at the depot (middle: Clovis, New Mexico). Public 
buildings often mark the horizon at the end of the street (bottom: Judith Basin County 
Courthouse, Stanford, Montana). 
FIG. 4. Business rows. Gaps along Main Street characterize towns that attracted little new 
capital investment after the early boom years (top: Colman, South Dakota). Minor variations 
in store fronts give the appearance of variety, although most business buildings were of a 
single size and shape (middle: Butte, Nebraska). Larger business blocks are hallmarks of 
towns that benefited from continued investment (bottom: Anadarko, Oklahoma). 
a street lined with small buildings of various 
heights, but fires and business failures took 
their toll in later years, and the gap-toothed 
look returned to Main Street. Towns that 
escaped this syndrome were fortunate to have a 
few aggressive entrepreneurs of some means 
who tore down the original structures and re-
placed them with larger business blocks; those 
towns are the ones surviving today as trade 
centers (Fig. 4). 
Although small buildings were a pervasive 
feature of all railroad towns, there was a dis-
tinct, regional architectural variation among 
them. A North Dakota Main Street was virtual-
ly a corridor between two walls of bare-faced, 
false-front buildings, set high, above snow 
depth. Farther south, the horizontal dimension 
took over, false fronts were shallower, the 
storefront was sheltered by a canopy over the 
sidewalk, and the floors tended to be closer to 
street level. Brick and stone were unusual, 
except for banks, in the Dakotas and Montana, 
frequent in Nebraska and Kansas, and dominant 
in Oklahoma and Texas. Such variations are 
not, of course, confmed to towns created by 
the railroads, nor do they reflect anything so 
much as well-known regional preferences and 
climatic adaptations in building design that 
moved in parallel streams, from east to west, 
along with the people (Fig. 5). 
Most townsite proprietors realized that they 
had to bend a little in order to build up a 
successful community. Few ministers of the 
gospel passed up the chance to ask for a free 
building lot for a church, and most such re-
quests were granted routinely, although the 
lots they were given generally occupied the far 
corners of the original plat, where small-town 
churches remain to this day. Somewhere 
was begun the practice of giving free lots to 
newborn babies; these requests, too, were 
often granted, however grudgingly, by the 
townsite agent. 27 Requests to use unsold lots 
(free) for a pasture for the family cow, to place 
a temporary building (free) on a salable lot, and 
many others were received and frequently 
granted. Because townsite proprietors received 
little good publicity, they undoubtedly used 
TOWNS OF THE WESTERN RAILROADS 51 
FIG. 5. Tall, bare false fronts characterize 
northern railroad towns (top: Barton, North 
Dakota). Shorter elevations and canopied walks 
were built simultaneously in railroad towns of 
the South (bottom: Dime Box, Texas). 
such opportunities to show that they were 
human, too. 
Although they donated lots for churches, 
schools, courthouses, and other public build-
ings, proprietors had a blind spot when it came 
to- improvements that might make their towns 
more livable. Parks, when they were donated 
at all, were taken from unsold, and probably 
unsalable, marginal land on which the proprie-
tOr wished to avoid further taxes. Requests 
to plant trees, gravel the streets, or drain wet 
depressions were overlooked unless the public 
rose up in anger. Townsite companies had no 
legal responsibility to make such improvements, 
and they constantly encouraged their towns to 
incorporate formally so that such problems 
would fall to local governments to solve. Once 
a town had gotten its start, company interest 
faded quickly as attention shifted to the next 
town lot sale somewhere else. 
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CONCLUSION 
The railroad companies took a restricted 
interest in the towns they had created, but the 
results of their efforts produced as many unin-
tended effects as intended ones. There can 
be no doubt that their townsite strategies dis-
couraged the appearance of other new towns 
created by parties other than the railroads. 
Only when railroads left the field open to 
intruders, and thereby signaled their lack of 
interest, did independent townsites fmd a per-
manent place along the tracks. Had railrCfads 
not been primarily interested in controlling 
these developments, there undoubtedly would 
have been more new towns platted, they would 
have fought each other for dominance, and 
some would have emerged successfully to grow 
into stable communities. In the long run, 
however, the changing conditions of retailing 
and marketing determined the success of a 
trade center. 
The unintended effects of railroad townsite 
policies made a greater impact on the internal 
structure of the communities themselves. First 
among these was the leveling effect produced 
by the railroads' view that all towns along the 
line would perform essentially the same func-
tion, that of funneling traffic to the railroad. 
This was to be accomplished by setting in place 
an up-and-coming business class that would 
make a good showing for the town. Railroads 
created a highly specialized division of labor 
among merchants at the outset by their policies 
on lot sizes and sales, which, in turn, encouraged 
small proprietorships rather than fewer but 
larger business firms. 
The railroad actually had a democratizing 
influence by making it possible for those with 
little capital to start a business, but if the peo-
ple who entered into these ventures held the 
ideals expected of them, they were not likely 
to be satisfied with such a state of affairs. 
Many were not content, and they soon emerged 
as community leaders, pooling their assets, 
founding stronger fmancial institutions, buying 
out their weaker competitors, building elegant 
homes, and generally behaving as merchants 
were expected to behave. Towns that witnessed 
such developments were seen as aggressive and 
healthy, and they were favored by railroad 
officials despite the fact that such economic 
evolution came about as a way of surviving the 
railroad's blueprint for settlement. 
Most railroad towns were failures. They did 
not have secure enough standing to survive the 
technological changes that began making small 
towns obsolete after 1920; this was especially 
true of the great number of towns founded in 
the last wave of American railroad building 
between 1905 and 1915. The failure of a town 
was blamed on the inhabitants-a judgement 
that was justified only to the extent that many 
towns did have an identical start. The evidence 
of failure, however, was that such towns were 
never able to throw off the small-business 
mentality that surrounded their creation by the 
railroad. They were static, born full grown, 
and they withered in a world that was anything 
but static. The western railroads thus bear a 
heavy burden for the losses suffered by hun-
dreds of thousands who believed what townsite 
agents told them about the prospects for a good 
life doing business in their town. 
Was there an alternative? What might have 
happened if federal land policies had played as 
significant a role in town building as they did in 
farm building? The few examples of govern-
ment townsites in Oklahoma offer mixed evi-
dence of success. Government townsite laws 
were few and they had little impact on the 
success of communities.28 If the railroads had 
taken a less active role in creating towns, how-
ever, there probably would have been greater 
variety from the results of diverse, uncoordi-
nated attempts to build not only trade-center 
towns but cities. That, after all, had been the 
pattern up to the time that railroads came along. 
The outcome might have been an urban geogra-
phy much different than the West has today. 
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